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THE FUTURE OF U.S. - INDIA RELATIONS

BY

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THE FUTURE OF U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Possibly no other bilateral relationship in the post World War II era has been filled with as much wishful thinking, myth and sincere disappointment as that between the United States and India. The U.S.-India relationship has been described as one of terminal confusion, a series of ups and many downs, and the "ideal marriage"[1] that never developed, a marriage that began and has remained on the rocks during most of the past forty-seven years.

Why has the "ideal couple", the world's two largest democracies, failed to achieve their great expectations for a lasting and beneficial relationship? What can they do in the future, if anything, to fulfill their expectations? In attempting to answer these complex and difficult questions with a simplified answer, we first look to the recent past where the hopes and expectations for the relationship began:

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

From 1941 - 1945, the United States was in an all-consuming world war with Germany, Japan and their allies. Great Britain was America's closest and most trusted ally and friend. From an American perspective, the British government of India (GOI) was the legitimate government of the Indian Sub-Continent. The GOI provided a secure base for the combined-U.S. war effort, and also a location to support the important the Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) struggle against the Japanese. The U.S. basic policy was that nothing should be done to undermine the GOI or give aid or comfort to its enemies, including the Indian nationalists who were "not cooperating" in the war against Japan. The Indian National Congress (INC) opposition to the British Raj was seen as a threat to the overall war effort. In essence from 1941 - 1945, the U.S. expected little more from India (GOI) than support for its military in the war with Japan,[2] which included U.S. support for China. The U.S. government viewed India as a British colony, a British issue to be disposed of after the war by some kind of future compromise. The American public, in general, was either indifferent to India or mostly uninformed. A small group of Americans did favor Indian independence and the INC, and another small group shared the British view that Indians could not possibly govern themselves. India and its future, however, was far less important to the U.S. than the prosecution of the war and maintaining close U.S. ties with Great Britain. Almost no one envisioned India as an important or significant figure on the post WWII political stage.

With the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's two dominant and adversarial super-powers. Two years later (August 1947) India, along with Pakistan, achieved their independence from Great Britain. It was widely assumed in America, at the time, that with Jawaharlal Nehru as India's Prime Minister, Mahatma Gandhi's political protege, the U.S. and India were destined to be allies and would see eye-to-eye concerning most of the major problems that would confront the world community in the post war era. It was to be "like a marriage made in heaven, with India and America living happily ever after."[3] As we know, this has not been the case. Instead of a happy marriage, a distinct pattern of mutual frustration, exasperation and even anger has appeared. Neither side could or has been able to develop a foreign policy that accommodates the other's vision of how security and social issues in the post-war world must be achieved and maintained. This continues to be a prominent issue for both countries today.[4] In examining reasons for the inability of the U.S. and India to achieve a warm working relationship, much less the marriage made in heaven, there appear to be several dominant factors that have precluded their understanding and cooperation.

CHAPTER III

DOMINANT FACTORS

American Dominant Factors

For America, the dominant factors impacting on its relationship with India have been U.S. capabilities and responsibilities as a post WWII world super-power and the pre-occupation, even fixation, with stopping or containing world communism, the Cold War.[5] As a world super-power, U.S. foreign policy has been defined and driven from the global rather than the regional or subregional perspective. The global perspective with its predominant anti-communist containment theme has more than often led the U.S. to reactive policies and positions which have been contradictory or inconsistent with otherwise desirable regional policies, objectives or interest.[6] Specific examples include U.S. military interventions in Vietnam, Grenada and Kuwait and the U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. U.S. interventions, even when seen as justified by most of the world community, have more often evoked strong regional anxieties, fears and concerns of U.S. superpower hegemony, imperialism or neo-colonialism.[7] In regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. has provided significant economic and military assistance to Pakistan in order to to aid the Afghan rebels and to prevent further Soviet expansion. While this supports U.S. global objectives of containing communism, from a regional perspective it does not support U.S. interest and objectives of balancing friendly relations with and between India and Pakistan. Further, it fuels a continuing and potentially very dangerous regional arms race.[8] In short, superpower capabilities for

hegemony often scare or genuinely concern regional nations. U.S. global anti-communist containment policies with their regional inconsistencies have caused significant consternation and difficulties for many countries, especially India, who want to deal with America and the Soviet Union on an equal basis.

Indian Dominant Factors

For India, the dominant factors impacting on its relationship with the U.S. have been its colonial experience, its non-aligned policies and its Asian sub-regional geo-demographic characteristics.[9] After 230 years of British colonial domination (1760 - 1947), India could not help but develop very strong anti-colonial attitudes and fears of potential superpower hegemony in the region.[10] To prevent this superpower hegemony, India has adopted and pursued a policy of stated non-alignment, a policy under which it supposedly would not become obligated to or specifically aligned with the interests of either the U.S. or USSR.[11] India has further promoted and extended this non-aligned strategy to include participation by other nations as a means of pursuing their non-superpower interest and objectives in the global order. Today, these non-aligned nations have become a significant world political force, with India often being recognized as a leader and spokesman for the movement.[12] Consequently, through the policy and strategy of non-alignment, India has attempted to balance, block and play-off U.S.-Soviet superpower interest in the region, preclude any political hegemony by either the U.S. or USSR, and to gain world recognition and support for many of its own interest and objectives.[13] While India has espoused a non-aligned policy, in actuality, India has enjoyed very close relations with the Soviet Union since its independence, and in 1971

completed an Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation.[14] This close alignment with the Soviet Union by the world's largest democracy, especially while it espoused non-alignment, has created a great deal of frustration for the U.S. in pursuit of its anti-communist containment objectives. Finally, in examining the factor of India's geo-demographic characteristics, it is clear that the country dominates all aspects of the South Asia sub-region: it is 850 million people strong (15% of the world's population); it contains 3.3 million square kilometers of land mass; it has 7500 kilometers of sea coast; and it has 15,200 kilometers of borders and frontiers with six different nations (islands not included). Further,it is strategically located within the Indian Ocean along critical sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and choke points, including the Straits of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Babal Mendab.[15] For these reasons and many more, India is a country that can not be overlooked or discounted when considering national interest or objectives within the Indian Ocean and the South Asia sub-region and its littorals.

From the brief historical review above, we know that the much anticipated and expected "marriage" between the U.S. and India did not occur. That while both countries enjoyed many similarities in their democratic systems, they were also faced with divergent dominant factors that clashed to preclude the expected outcome of a strong mutual relationship. For the U.S. these dominant factors included: world superpower capabilities, responsibilities and anti-communist containment policies of the Cold War. For India, the dominant factors were anti-colonialism, non-alignment and geo-demographic characteristics. Specific examples of the clashes of these factors included: India ties with and support for the Soviet Union, the U.S.'s principal security

threat, and U.S. support for and ties with Pakistan and China, India's principle security threats.[16]

As described, U.S.-India relations did not fulfill initial expectations or desires. The question is where do we stand now? Are the same dominant factors still at play in U.S.-India relations or are new dynamics changing and reshaping them? If so, what are the dynamics and what is the relationship?

CHAPTER IV

PERSPECTIVES

As a world superpower, the U.S. must view its relations with India from a global perspective. India will be only one of many and various competing interests that must be prioritized as part of the U.S. overall national security strategy. The same, of course, is true from the India perspective. For both the U.S. and India, the interdependence and prioritization of these national interests will be significant, if not the determinant, of the direction and the future of their relationship. In order to understand the nature and complexity of these competing interests, both a U.S. global and Indian perspective are provided to outline the magnitude.

The U.S. Global Perspective

U.S. national interest and objectives for the 1990's have been defined by the White House as the following:

"The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.

A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights and democratic institutions.

and

Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations."[17]

Regionally, these U.S. interest and objectives have taken the following perspectives:

Europe and the Soviet Union: For the immediate future, relations with Europe and the Soviet Union will be one of the U.S.'s two top priorities. The U.S. has won the Cold War: East and West Germany have united; the Warsaw Pact is gone; Communism is dead; Soviet republics are attempting to declare independence and, in general, the Soviet Union is in complete political and economic disorder. With the death of communism, the world is no longer bi-polar and a new world order is emerging which is yet to be defined.[18] For the U.S., key European and Soviet issues will include: defining the U.S.'s place and role in the evolving multi-polar world order; assisting in establishing stability in the region favorable to the U.S. and its allies; the continued promotion of democratic values and systems; nuclear weapons stability, reductions and non-proliferation; mutual force reductions and withdrawals; the continued importance of NATO; and promotion of U.S. economic access and interest in the region.

Middle East: In the Middle East, currently the U.S. and twenty-nine other nations are concluding a U.N. sanctioned war with Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait. For the U.S., the successful completion of this war and achievement of stated war aims will be its number one world priority. Critical U.S. Middle East issues associated with this will include: establishment of favorable stability in the region; reconstruction of war-damaged countries; ensuring the continued flow of oil and other resources; environmental

restoration; prevention of nuclear and chemical proliferation; addressal of peaceful solutions to Israeli, Arab and Palestinian issues; stemming the negative aspects of religious fundamentalism; obtaining release of U.S. and other hostages; insuring a healthy balance of power in the region; elimination of terrorist activities; assisting in development of a stable and free Lebanon; preventing or limiting Soviet influence in the region; and establishing friendly political and economic ties with all countries of the region to the degree possible. The Middle East and resource access will continue to be a vital U.S. interest for at least the near to mid term.

Africa: Due to competing world requirements and limited U.S. resources, Africa will remain a minor interest to the U.S. Specific exceptions to this will include: Egypt, South Africa and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The U.S. will continue to place emphasis on strong ties with Egypt to foster regional stability in North Africa and the Middle East. For South Africa, the U.S. will attempt to assist in resolution of human rights issues, will seek prevention of nuclear proliferation and to re-establish political and major economic ties.

Americas: Canada, Mexico, Central America, Caribbean and Latin America will all continue to be important if not vital to U.S. interest. However, the Middle East war, events in Europe and the Soviet Union, the economic importance of Asia and U.S. budget restraints will act to severely limit U.S. ability or inclination to pursue broad goals and objectives for the region. The U.S. will continue to react swiftly to prevent the spread of communism or Cuban influence in the region. Other significant interests and issues will include: regional stability; promotion of democratic values and systems; economic

cooperation and development; human rights; environmental concerns (rain forest); narcotics control; transfer of the Panama Canal; terrorism and prevention of nuclear and chemical proliferation. However, unless a major threat appears in the near term, the region will not receive the high priority the U.S. would otherwise like to give it. Exceptions will continue to include trade with Canada, access to Mexican and Venezuelan oil and possibly new Mexican economic initiatives.

Asia - Pacific: The 1990's are now being classified as the U.S.-Asian-Pacific decade.[19] In the projected multi-polar world, U.S. national security interest will be more closely tied to world markets and economic interest than ever before. National security will rest more and more on the "combination" of economic and military strength.[20] There is no better example of this than in the Asia-Pacific region today. U.S. trade with Asia has exceeded that of Europe for the past 18 years. From 1989 - 1991, U.S.-Pacific trade exceeded U.S. trade with with Canada, Mexico and South America combined. The region has accounted for about 39 percent of the world trade and 47 percent of the world's total 1989-90 output. Asia-Pacific combined GNP exceeded Europe's for the first time in modern history last year, and is continuing to grow at a rate of about 3%. As can be seen from these impressive statistics, the Asian region is of extreme if not vital importance to the U.S. and the rest of the world.[21] During the 1990s, Asia may well become the U.S.'s dominant regional national security and economic interest, replacing Europe of the past 45 years. For India, who is the dominant South Asia nation, this increased U.S. interest in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region will be of significant importance to its national security interest, objectives and future. Specific U.S.-Asia regional objectives will include: maintaining overall economic and

political stability in the region; ensuring the vitality of a prosperous and growing regional economy; encouraging respect for political freedom, democracy and human rights; and maintaining cooperative, active relations with allies and friendly nations.[22] Under these four overall objectives, major specific issues will include: active U.S. participation in Asia's expanding economic life; prevention of Soviet presence and activities detrimental to U.S. and allied interest; a continued U.S.-Japanese cooperative economic and security relationship;* maintaining security on the Korean peninsula; retention of U.S. bases in Asia (Philippines, Korea, Japan, Singapore, etc.); resolution of border and territorial disputes (Spratley Islands, Kashmir, China-India, India-Pakistan, China-Vietnam); nuclear non-proliferation issues; participation and cooperation with regional associations (ASEAN, SAARC, etc.); maintaining or development of regional security relationships and alliances (ANZUS, U.N. Command Korea and Japan, U.S.-Philippine security agreements); new diplomatic initiatives in South East Asia (Vietnam and Cambodia); security and stability of Taiwan; and the peaceful transfer of Hong Kong and Macau to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively.[24]

As can be seen from the above U.S. global perspective, the U.S. is a world superpower with numerous complex worldwide interest and objectives, many of which are competing. Just how will these U.S. global interests impact on the U.S.-India relations?

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*Japan is "vital" to U.S. interest. An economic superpower, it is the linchpin to the entire region's economic development and security. U.S. and Japan control "40 percent of all the wealth of the world with but 8 percent of the world's population"23

The most significant of the above regional factors impacting on U.S. relations with India is the death of communism and the end of the Cold War. This event potentially allows the U.S. to look at and evaluate interests and issues in their true regional or global context, and not in the absolute terms of containment of global communism.[25] This freedom, combined with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, allows the U.S. to re-evaluate its South Asian interests and policy from a regional perspective and to take a more balanced regional approach. Additionally, with the end of communism, the Indian position on non-alignment becomes irrelevant to its relationship with the U.S. There is either only one superpower or a multi-polar world.[26] This represents a significant change to both U.S. and India dominant factors that previously controlled U.S.-India relations. The change presents significant possibilities for greatly improved U.S.-India relations.

The Iraq war will consume U.S. interest and efforts until complete. It will detract from U.S.-India relations in several ways. The most significant impacts will include: regional instability; increased Arab religious fundamentalism (India has almost 90 million Muslims[27]); interruption of Indian access to resources; revenues lost from dislocation of Indian workers; and divided loyalties and hatred always evoked by war. A major positive factor of the war is the reinforcement of the concept that the U.N. can play a regional or global role in conflict resolution.

The most significant Americas factors impacting on U.S.-India relationships are those internal to the U.S. They are the U.S. national debt and the U.S. trade deficit. The U.S. debt will translate in many ways but specifically in reduced dollars for

international assistance and reduction of U.S. forces overseas. This will potentially impact on many regional stability programs. The U.S. trade deficit will promote U.S. market controls on imports and government assessment of trading activities for those countries with excess trade balances. India has already been identified as needing to change or modify some of its trade practices with the U.S.[28] The U.S. is currently India's number one individual economic trading partner. India, however, only imports 9% of its products from the U.S,[29] while enjoying a significant trade surplus balance.

U.S. interest in Africa will only have a minor effect, if any, on U.S. policy towards India. Possible future exceptions may be improved U.S.-South Africa relations, U.S. and East Africa littoral contacts, U.S.-North Africa Arab issues and access to SLOCs.

U.S.-Asian-Pacific interest and policy will, as stated earlier, focus on Japan as the linchpin to regional and economic security and development. In relation to the other nations of the region (Japan, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan), India will be seen by the U.S. as less than a major interest in the overall area. An exception to this could result from further Indian military expansion or a conflict in the region.

In summary, U.S. priorities of the Middle East war, evolving events in Europe and the Soviet Union, U.S.-Japanese relations, the U.S. national debt and trade deficit, and numerous other major world-wide interest will take priority over most U.S.-India interest and relations.[30] Unless a significant destabilizing event occurs in the region (war, border conflict, intervention, etc.), the U.S. may, for the near term, continue the

low priority approach in its relations with India.[31]

Indian Perspective

While the U.S. perspective, as a world superpower, is global, the India perspective is more from a South-Asia or regional point of view. This does not mean it lacks a global or inter-regional perspective, but more how it views its interest in a global context.[32] Like all nations, survival and prosperity in a secure and stable environment are the basis of its national interest. Included in this are the protection of the core values of democratic norms, secular polity, federal structure, social justice and fundamental human rights.[33]

India, unlike America, is still very much in the nation building process[34]; it has enjoyed only forty-five years of evolving democracy. Next to national survival, India's highest priority goes to its country's socio-economic development. As a country of 850 million diverse people with a growth rate of 2 percent and a $400 per capita income, economic growth, development and national stability are all vital if the country is to continue to meet minimum essential needs for its people.[35]

India's most significant national security threats include internal instability, China and Pakistan:

Internal instability: As stated above, India is a diverse country of 850 million people still in the nation-building process. The country has 14 different official languages, 24 other languages spoken by a million or more people, and hundreds of lesser

languages and dialects. Only 30 percent of the people can speak Hindi, the national language. India has a literacy rate of only 36 percent, with a 20 percent unemployment rate and only $400 per capita income.[36] The nation contains hundreds of different religious groups, sects, castes, tribes and ethnic divisions all with diverse needs and desires. These and numerous other related issues of such a diverse and massive culture translate into internal and political instability. Specific examples of the instability include: Sikh-Hindu conflicts, religious and tribal separatism ("Jharkland", Bodoland and Punjab) and Hindu-Muslim issues to name only a few.[37] Consequently maintenance of internal stability and resolution of these issues are vital to India's national survival and certainly to its relations with the U.S. and other world nations.[38]

China: India views China as its most dangerous external national threat.[38] In 1962 both countries engaged in a territorial conflict in which India lost 38,000 km^2s of its (claimed) territory. China further claims another 90,000 km^2s of India territory, and holds 10,000 km^2 of disputed land ceded to it by Pakistan.[40] The Chinese have the second largest military in the world of 3.2 million,[41] a nuclear capability and intermediate range missiles which can deliver nuclear or conventional warheads. China provides political and military support to Pakistan, India's next largest external threat and is viewed as promoting anti-Indian sentiment among India's neighboring nations.[42] China further views itself as the third world or non-aligned leader, a role which is strongly challenged by India.[43]

Pakistan: After China, Pakistan is considered India's second largest external threat, and the most likely aggressor.[44] Pakistan and India have been at conflict since

independence in 1947. The countries have fought at least two major wars, 1965 and 1971; the India victory of 1971 resulted in East Pakistan becoming Bangladesh. Today the two continue to have territorial disputes and engagements over the states of Jammu and Kashmir and additional areas. The issues between the two countries are deeply complex and extremely emotional. They involve religious and communal value systems and national core values which cannot be easily resolved either through political measures or war. The area of Kashmir is one in which conflict could break out at anytime.[45] Pakistan has the world's tenth largest army of 550,000[46] and is an ally with China. Additionally, it is reported to be very close to developing a nuclear capability.[47] Pakistan is also a close ally with the United States, and has strongly supported U.S. anti-communist objectives in Afghanistan against the Soviets. In doing so, the U.S. has provided large amounts of security assistance and high technology military equipment (F-16 aircraft) to Pakistan to support their efforts. This military equipment and assistance is seen by India as a direct threat and destabilizing situation for their nation.[48]

To meet the threats described above, India has developed the fourth largest military in the world, 1.3 million.[49] In 1974, it clearly demonstrated it had a nuclear capability by detonating a nuclear device; it has, also, subsequently developed an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. Today, the Indian military is continuing its expansion, with special emphasis on its navy.[50] This includes the addition of aircraft carriers and attack submarines for its fleet. Regional neighbors have expressed major concern over this expansion.[51] However, India has justified its need for expansion by identifying the China-Pakistan threat, its Indian Ocean island responsibilities, its large coastline, that 97 percent of its economic goods arrive by sea, and the need to protect

SLOCs and other Indian Ocean interest.

Having discussed India's two greatest threat nations, we now look at its relations with other important neighbors and allies:

South Asia Neighbors (Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma and Sri Lanka)

With the possible exception of Bhutan, India's relations with its immediate neighbors are classified as "stressed."[52] This does not mean open hostilities, and in many instances there is significant cooperation.

Bangladesh: With Bangladesh (118 million people, 83% Muslim, 16% Hindu), India has several heated disputes. They include: boundaries, water sharing problems, communal issues and instability (tribal and religious), drug transit and illegal trade, and its cooperation and close ties with China and Pakistan.[53]

Nepal: In Nepal, dispute issues involve trade and transit rights through India (Nepal is landlocked) and Nepal weapons purchases and cooperation with China.[54]

Burma: Burma issues involve human rights (treatment of students and refugees), sale and transit of illegal drugs in India and Bangladesh and cooperation and relations with China.[55]

Sri Lanka: Issues include the India Tamil support for Sri Lanka Tamil rebels and Indian Peace Force activities while stationed on the Sri Lanka island.[56]

Another major issue expressed by most of these neighbors is their deep concern of India's continuing military build up. This concerr has been heightened by the fact that India already has the fourth largest military in the world and has used force several times in the recent past (right or wrong not at issue). Examples include: Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Kashmir.[57] India's response to their concern was previously

discussed above. The bottom line is that India's South-Asia neighbors fear the potential of Indian hegemony.

A more positive factor in the South Asia relations (includes Pakistan) is the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This organization was established by the regional nations to promote cooperation and to deal with multi-lateral issues especially trade and economics. While not rated widely successful by all, it is an organization that brings South Asian representatives together to mutually deal with their interest and problems.[58]

Soviet Union: During the past thirty-five years, the Soviet Union has been one of India's closest world partners. It has provided India with 60 - 75 percent of its defense equipment and at a cost that could not be obtained elsewhere.[59] It has provided major impetus for India's defense industry and technological base through steps such as license manufacture and technology transfer. India has further enjoyed many straight assistance and aid packages and special arrangements such as the rupee-rouble trade. Further, the Soviet Union has strongly supported Indian positions in relations with China, Pakistan and the United States. However, with new events in Europe, the death of communism, and the disorder, if not the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant change in India-Soviet relations maybe dictated.

In the future, the Soviet Union will not be able to afford the low cost support and assistance it has provided for so long. Internal conditions and requirements will, for the most part, demand the Soviet's full attention and resources. Many of the resources dedicated to military production will be significantly diminished in conversion of assets from military to civilian needs. An exception to this may be the Soviet Union's requirements for hard currency, which could result in continued low cost military sales

to obtain the needed international funds.

With the death of Soviet communism, the world is no longer bi-polar. Relations, interest and objectives will have to be reviewed and addressed in a new world context and order. Even if India's military objectives can be met with Soviet assistance, India's fundamental needs and core values for development and stability can not. For this India will need to look to the "developed world" and its own capabilities and resources.[60]

European Community (EC): Overall, India has enjoyed a very successful relationship with the EC. As a combined group of countries, it is India's largest trading partner (25 - 30 percent).[61] Along with the Soviet Union, the EC has also provided India with significant military equipment over the past years. In the new developing world order, the EC may very well emerge as one of the more influential and powerful global poles. The future for continued beneficial Indian relations with the EC appears to be excellent. For the U.S., the EC will represent a major economic competitor in its relations with India.

Middle East: The Middle East is a major exporter to India (19% of India's total imports). The majority of goods are energy related, with over 30% of India's oil requirements coming from this area.[62] Additionally, the Middle East has proven to be fertile grounds for India workers seeking employment. This foreign hire has helped alleviate India's unemployment problem and has served as an additional source of revenue.

The current war in the Gulf is having a significant negative impact on India's economy. It has resulted in increased energy cost, interrupted sea lines of communication and dislocated India workers, with resultant unemployment and revenue loss. Additionally, with India's large Muslim population and India's support of U.N.

forces, the war has generated at least some religious, ethnic, communal and other internal instabilities. India support for U.N. and U.S. forces, however, may have a very positive effect on near term and future U.S.-India cooperation.

Japan: Japan is India's most significant Asian trading partner, accounting for approximately 10 percent of India's total foreign trade.[63] It has provided large amounts of investment capital and its interest in India appears to be expanding rapidly every year. Indian-Japanese relations are very stable and Japan will continue to be a major economic partner. For the U.S., Japan will represent a major economic force in the sub-region and a very strong competitor.

CHAPTER V

U.S.-INDIA SOUTH ASIA EXPECTATIONS

Having reviewed the U.S. and India's global and regional persoectives and their external relations with others, we now look at what the U.S. and India want or expect from each other in South-Asia.

U.S.:

First the U.S. recognizes that India must be [illegible]t of any future strategy to maintain peace and regional stability in Asia. Also, that India is the world's largest democracy and is without question the dominant power in South-Asia.[64] This being recognized, the U.S.'s overall South-Asia objectives are regional peace and stability, balance and prosperity.[65] These objectives specifically translate to or include:[66]

A. Prevention of regional hegemony or aggression by any nation or power (this includes India).

B. Non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery means (China, India and Pakistan).

C. Promotion of peaceful relations and confidence building measures between India, Pakistan and China. This encompasses peaceful resolution or addressal of territorial and boundary disputes (ex. Kashmir).

D. Reduction of Soviet influence in the region that is detrimental to U.S. and allied interest.

E. Promotion and development of close working relationships between U.S.-India

government officials, representatives and agencies.

F. Promotion of closer U.S.-India military ties and direct cooperation. This includes potential naval exercises, officer and unit exchanges, etc.

G. Establishment of agreements for port calls and facility use.

H. Continued close U.S. ties and relations with Pakistan while ensuring balance and stability of the sub-region are maintained.

I. Pursuit of peaceful relations with China while ensuring balance and stability of the region are maintained.

J. Maintenance or pursuit of peaceful relations with India's sub-regional neighbors: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan.

K. Maintenance of sufficient U.S. presence in the Asia region and Indian Ocean to promote stability, deter aggression and ensure free sea lines of communication.

L. Fair and equitable access to resources, markets and capital within the sub-region.

M. Promotion of fair and equitable trade and tariff agreements which benefit U.S., India and sub-region economies.

N. Cooperation on appropriate South-Asia-U.S. narcotics and terrorist activities.

O. Reduction and stemming of religious and communal fundamentalism.

P. Promotion of democracy and democratic values within the sub-region to include human rights issues.

India:

India expectations and objectives in its relations with the U.S. are very similar in that they are also based on peace, stability, balance and prosperity, but obviously from the

India, South Asia perspective. India specific objectives and interest with the U.S. include:[67]

A. Prevention of regional hegemony or aggression by any nation or power, this includes the U.S.

B. Recognition by the U.S. that India is the dominant or preeminent power in South-Asia, includes recognition of enhanced military capabilities in the sub-region and Indian Ocean, especially naval forces.

C. Reduced U.S. military presence in South-Asia and Indian Ocean, while sufficient U.S. presence is maintained to promote overall stability among South-Asian neighbors.

D. Continued mutual Soviet-India relations while improving U.S.-India relations.

E. Maintaining status and ties with non-aligned (South) nations.

F. Reduced or minimized U.S. support or ties to Pakistan and China, especially military and high technology items.

G. Ensuring that India is not held hostage or threatened by nuclear weapons capable nations, U.S. included.

H. Promotion and development of close working relationships between key India-U.S. government officials, representatives and agencies.

I. Promotion of closer India-U.S. military ties and cooperation (includes light combat aircraft development and military exchanges).

J. Improved trade, tariff, technology and intellectual rights agreements beneficial to India economic, industrial and scientific development.

K. Minimizing internal instability impacts that may result from increased relations with the U.S.: Gulf war outcome, Indian-Russian cooperation, previous U.S.

support of Pakistan and China, and anti-colonial fears or feelings.

As can be seen from the above U.S. and India expectations, there are many areas which promise significant improvements to U.S.-India relations. There are also, however, just as many that may prevent improvement and even set back the progress gained to date. A few of the more principal potential areas of disagreement include: continued India-Soviet ties; U.S. military and economic support to Pakistan and China; India "non-aligned" positions detrimental to U.S. interest; U.S. unilateral superpower decisions relative to the sub-region; U.S.-India nuclear proliferation positions; U.S.-India trade, economic and technology disagreements and the amount of U.S.-India military presence in the Indian Ocean and sub-region. While these areas may represent significant challenges or road blocks to improved U.S.-India relations, they are all far from being unresolvable between the two countries.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Having looked at the past and present aspects of U.S.-India relations, the following conclusions are drawn and provided in regard to the future of U.S.-India relations:

A. First and foremost, the world environment has significantly changed. With the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union (economically and politically), a new order is evolving. U.S. and India interest and relations will also be evolving in the context of the new order.

B. The fundamental values and interest of both the U.S. and India will remain the same (democracy, peace, stability, balance and national prosperity). Both nations will see it in their best interest to foster improved relations to achieve their own objectives.

C. Because of the death of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union (economically and politically), several of the fundamental factors previously shaping U.S.-India relations have changed. For the U.S., it will no longer have to pursue a policy of global (communist) containment. It may now develop and implement strategies that are more consistent and applicable to regional and sub-regional interest and objectives. It will however, have to view its interest in context of the new global order.

D. For India, the Soviet Union's collapse means that it must start looking elsewhere (West or North) for much of the support it once received. India's "non-aligned" policy will no longer be relevant in its relations with the U.S.; the world is evolving into a multi-polar structure where non-aligned no longer carries the same

meaning.

E. As a super-power, U.S. interest and perspective will remain global. Due to more demanding global priorities: events in Europe and the Soviet Union, war in the Gulf, national debt and trade deficits, U.S.-Japanese relations and many others, U.S. interest in South-Asia and with India will continue to be less than major. U.S.-India relations, from the U.S. perspective, will be a reflection of its global priorities.

F. Due to India's massive population, diversity (language, religion, ethnic and cultural background, etc.) and minimum per capita income, internal stability and continued economic development will be a vital interest equal to or greater than its external threats.[68]

G. China and Pakistan will remain India's principle security threats. While China poses the greatest survival threat to India, Pakistan will continue to be the most probable threat of conflict. This is based upon prolonged territorial disputes over Jammu and Kashmir and other territorial, ethnic, tribal, religious and communal disagreements. India-Pakistan issues will not be easily resolved in the future and the chance for conflict between the two nations remains very high. India and China continue to talk, with some progress on their territorial arguments being made. However, all territorial issues and disputes will not be resolved and the potential for future conflict remains.

H. The U.S. will continue to support Pakistan as a friend and ally. However, with the Soviet collapse, its withdrawal from Afghanistan and U.S.-Pakistan nuclear proliferation issues, U.S. assistance and aid to Pakistan will be significantly reduced. Additionally, with the diminished Soviet threat to the region, the U.S. will be able to pursue a more balanced and consistent approach to its sub-regional relationships. The

new U.S. regional flexibility should further improve U.S.-India relations.

I. The U.S. will continue to seek improved ties with China. Any technological or military assistance to China will be perceived by India as a threat to its national interest and will negatively impact on U.S.-India relations.

J. India views itself as the pre-eminent power in the sub-region and seeks appropriate recognition and respect. It has long felt that it has not received (especially from the U.S.) the attention it deserves for a nation of its size and potential.[69] As the sub-regional dominant power, it sees its interest ranging from the Suez Canal to the Straits of Malacca, including the Indian Ocean littorals.[70] To fulfill its perceived destiny, India is now developing and expanding its political and military structure to support its regional interest, and achieve appropriate recognition and respect.

K. India's sub-regional neighbors are concerned over India's expanding military capabilities, especially its navy. These neighbors view U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean as a stabilizing influence to a potential Indian threat.

L. As the dominant power in the sub-region, India would generally like to see the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the region. However, due to the Gulf war and expressed concerns over its expanding navy, India also views a minimum U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean as stabilizing.[71]

M. India colonial history and concerns of U.S. hegemony will remain an issue in U.S.-India relations. India will seek to balance U.S. super-power capabilities through relations with other regional power centers (Japan, European Community, Soviet Union) and its status as a "non-aligned" nation. Non-aligned, however, will have a different meaning in the evolving multi-polar world.

N. Nuclear and missile proliferation will remain a sub-regional issue that will be

difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to resolve. India will not unilaterally reject its right to be a nuclear nation. Its position will be: if nuclear power is an option for one country, especially a principle threat like China, it must remain an option for another.[72]

O. Economics, more than ever, will be a dominant factor in future U.S.-India relations. The U.S. is India's number one (individual) trading partner and India will seek to maintain strong ties and a satisfactory relationship. India will specifically seek greater freedom in U.S. technology transfer and protection for its own industries and products.[73] The U.S. has recently named India as an unfair trading partner and placed it on a trade watch. America will seek greater access to India markets and protection for its technology and intellectual property rights. Improved economic relations will be dependent upon resolution of perceived unfair trading practices.

P. Since the death of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, evolving U.S. political, military and economic policies appear to adequately support U.S. interest and peace and stability for South-Asia. Policies now appear to be more consistent with regional and sub-regional objectives compared to the past policies aimed at communist containment.

CHAPTER VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, as a general statement, U.S. decision and policy makers appear to understand the interest and issues involved with Asia and the South-Asia sub-region. They further appear to know what direction the U.S. needs to take, and they are rapidly developing the appropriate strategies and actions to get there.[73] In this context, the following recommendations are not intended as criticism, but as a means of emphasis or review:

A. Overall U.S. policies and actions in the sub-region must contribute to peace, stability, balance and economic prosperity. To accomplish this, the U.S. must develop a coordinated strategy and vision that will balance major interest with and between (at least) the U.S., India, China and Pakistan.

B. Territorial disputes between Pakistan, India and China will represent a significant threat to security and stability of the region. This is especially true of the Jammu and Kashmir area. To the degree possible, the U.S. should remain neutral while attempting to have the concerned parties conduct peaceful negotiations to resolve differences. Additionally, the U.S. should promote confidence building measures between the disputing countries. This would include notification of military exercises, on-site inspections or exchange visits. These territorial disputes will not be easily resolved in the near future. Without some steps toward peaceful discussion, the likelyhood for conflict remains high.

C. Internal instability poses a significant threat to India and the other nations of the sub-region. While the U.S. should not become directly involved in internal affairs, it

should look at assistance and aid packages that can help with the nation-building process. Additionally, to the degree possible, the U.S. should promote democratic values and ideals that also strenghten stability.

D. Soviet presence and influence in India and the region may not be in the best interest of the U.S. and the sub-region as a whole. India however, has maintained favorable relations with Russia over the past forty-plus years. In this regard India will most likely seek to continue its Soviet relationship. The U.S. should not take any actions to undermine the India-USSR relationship. The U.S. should, however, identify what Russia is providing in terms of goods and services and atttempt to replace them with a better package. Reduced Soviet influence in India and the sub-region will be significantly facilitated by the Soviet Union's current internal problems and the collapse of communism.

E. U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and region is an issue of interest by all the South-Asia nations. In general, for one reason or another, they all see U.S. presence in their best interest. Most desire a minimum essential force that promotes regional stability. In that this also supports U.S. interest of regional stability, a minimum U.S. force presence (Navy) should be retained.

F. India currently has the fourth largest military in the world and is significantly improving its capabilities. With the opportunity of improved realtions, the U.S. military should take advantage of and expand U.S.-India military initiatives. This could cover the gamut: from exchanges, combined exercises, visits to equipment procurement. It still must be remembered, however, to consider other regional interest, for example the impact on Pakistan and China.

G. Nuclear proliferation will remain a significant U.S. regional concern. India

and China have demonstrated their nuclear capability and it appears Pakistan will soon join the nuclear club. The U.S. has made numerous efforts to prevent proliferation; however, it is very unlikely that any of these three nations will reject their rights to be nuclear capable. The U.S. must continue its efforts to prevent further proliferation and possibly attempt to limit the degree of nuclear capability for these nations. The U.S. should continue non-proliferation initiatives through every reasonable source possible. Possible developing ABM and SDI technologies will hold hope for a future breakthrough in this area.

H. Economics and trade will be one of the cornerstones to future U.S.-India relations. Currently, the U.S. is India's number one trading partner, while India is on a U.S. congressional watch list for unfair trading practices. If U.S. and India relations are to progress further it will be necessary to resolve major differences. Key issues, at this time, involve easier U.S. access to Indian markets, technology transfer and intellectual property rights. Both countries have held recent conferences to address the issues and obtain solutions. These conferences should continue until an acceptable answer is found or compromise achieved.

I. Many of the nations of the world have created regional agencies to promote cooperaton and regional development. Two very successful examples include the European Community (EC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In South Asia, SAARC (South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation) has also been established for similar purposes. Its members consist of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. SAARC, unlike the EC and ASEAN however, has not been that successful. It does however provide a formal South-Asia forum. The U.S. is a principal trading partner with almost all the SAARC nations. It is recommended that the

U.S., if possible, establish a formal relationship with SAARC to promote and coordinate South-Asia and U.S. sub-regional interest. This agency may provide a forum, that would otherwise not be available, to resolve U.S.-South Asia issues.

J. India proclaims itself to be a member of the non-aligned nations. In the past, this has often meant non-aligned with the U.S., but aligned with the Soviet Union. Additionally, it has sometimes appeared that India has often taken the opposite positions to the U.S. only to prove its non-alignment. From the U.S. perspective, this has definitely not been in its interest. With the death of communism, non-alignment should be identified as having no relevant meaning. Additionally, the U.S. should clearly identify the advantages of being aligned as mutual partners. India is now considered as one of the global multi-polar centers[75] and the dominant power in its sub-region. If India is truly going to assume these leadership roles in the world, it must understand the differences between non-aligned and being accepted as a global multi-polar power. In this regard, the U.S. should seek mutual economic, political and military agreements that will generate peace, stability, balance and prosperity for India, the U.S. and the sub-region. Formal U.S.-India alliances, political, military or economic, could significantly change current Asia dynamics and improve relations for the long term.

CHAPTER VIII

BOTTOM LINE

Having looked at the many aspects associated with the future of U.S.-India relations, we finally reach the bottom line. Due to the death of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the U.S. and India are in excellent positions to significantly improve relations. Additionally, improved relations appear to be in the best interest of both nations. The U.S. will seek improved relations, however, India will not be a major priority in U.S. global interest and strategy. Further U.S.-Pakistan-China ties and India-U.S. trade issues will all contribute to limiting any significant gains. India will also seek improved relations. Economics, trade and technology will be at the top of its priority list. However, continuing ties with the Soviet Union, its non-aligned position, internal instability and Indo-Pakistan issues will dilute much of the potential for progress. In short, there will most likely be improvement in U.S-India relations, however it will be slow and mostly uneventful - more of a casual date than a marriage.

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

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